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“Good job, but Bulgarian”: Identifying “Bulgarian-ness” through cultural discourse
analysis
Abstract
By using cultural discourse analysis and ethnography, naturally occurring talk and interviews
were examined for local constructions of “Bulgarian-ness” in order to formulate explicit and
implicit cultural propositions about being “Bulgarian,” and cultural premises about being
(“Bulgarian-ness” as problematic) and emotion (anger, frustration) as connected. This article
illustrates the notion of the phrase as a local cultural symbol within Bulgarian discourse that
evokes deep cultural meanings for a way of being (“Bulgarian-ness” and the West/East
dichotomy), emotions (frustration, hopelessness), and a social world (the “Bulgarian situation”)
as continuously negotiated in relation to conceptualizations of “Balkanism.”
Key words: identity, Bulgaria, cultural discourse analysis, post-socialism, emotion
Introduction
Xубава работа, ама българска.
Hubava rabota, ama Balgarska.
Good job, but Bulgarian.
The above-mentioned phrase is widely known and frequently used within everyday Bulgarian
discourse. It is used in instances when a job has been performed just barely: not done completely,
with minimum effort, resources, or interest. When you sweep but leave most of the dirt behind.
When you fix a leaky pipe superficially. When you finish things not in the up-to-code, but in the
easiest possible way. The emphasis is not on doing so because of lack of resources or abilities,
but out of laziness, lack of desire, or even on purpose. It is hubava rabota, ama Bulgarska when
the streets with dangerous potholes have finally been fixed (after numerous complaints and
delays) but are repaired with faulty/cheap material and start crumbling again within a month. It is
hubava rabota, ama Bulgarska, when new “organic” foods are introduced in the local market
only to soon be discovered as cheap ordinary produce. It is hubava rabota, ama Bulgarska when
you hire manual laborers to finish a roof and they take the initial payment without ever showing
up to work. The examples are numerous. Just as a joke I recently googled the phrase. First, using
the Cyrillic alphabet, I only had to type as far as “nice job but” for the search engine to autofill
the rest. Pages upon pages appeared with the following content:

-

A post with pictures of streets with potholes and faulty asphalt highlighting the lack of
repair for years despite numerous complaints (2018)

-

An editorial on being lazy in the office enumerating all the ways one can procrastinate
and do as little as possible (2016)

-

A scathing editorial on the 2016 political debacle and corruption charges of the Brazilian
president, emphasizing that the president has “Bulgarian roots,” and therefore her “screw
ups” can be blamed on that, calling it the bacilicus bulgaricus (2016)

-

Another scathing editorial on the topic of a major road along the coastline of Bulgaria,
which took years to be paved, which was made so narrow, that two cars could barely pass
each other (2015)

-

A case of an electric pole in a small town, and which was not safe with such strong
electricity passing through it that it damaged the road’s asphalt (2016)

-

A sports’ article on the numerous issues with corruption in the Bulgarian soccer leagues
(2015)

-

An article discussing the opening of a new highway in the country, focusing on the
numerous years and EU funding that was appropriated during its construction (2011)

This is just the first page of searches. Most of these situations could occur anywhere: government
and administrative corruption is not singularly Bulgarian. Issues of state organizations being
slow to respond to road conditions can be observed in many places. And sports teams’ scandals
are nothing new. So why are these phenomena labeled as “Bulgarian?” What is the character and
political significance of such national framings in so-called transitional societies like Bulgaria?
With its focus on the micro-discourses of identity in Bulgaria, this project aims to contribute to
the larger scholarship on interaction, intercultural and international communication,
post-socialism, and transitology research.
As Ghodsee (2011) has demonstrated, Bulgaria is a particularly fruitful post-socialist
field of study as it was a unique yet representative case of a country transitioning from socialism
to democracy. It is unique—as the country used to be one of the closest allies of the USSR
during its socialist period (despite not being part of the Soviet Union), yet representative—as it
shares numerous traits with other countries: losing the promise of lifetime employment, the

privatization of property, the creation of free markets, the rise of new nationalism, and a growing
nostalgia towards the socialist past. Hence, using cultural discourse analysis (Carbaugh, 2007;
Carbaugh & Cerulli, 2017) this study interrogates the social identity of “Bulgarian-ness”, as
constructed through an “us” vs. “others” alignment. I illustrate how a generalized notion of the
“others” as related to a post-socialist background is evoked and managed within social
interactions in Bulgarian discourse. This is not to say that all people in Bulgaria embrace these
symbols and forms of identification, but that such cultural symbols and their meanings are
widely available and historically situated discursive resources, which participants frequently
employ in interactions.
Whether called a “Bulgarian mentality” (Author, 2018), Bulgarshtina (“Bulgarian-ness”),
Bulgarska mu rabota (“Bulgarian job/way”), or “Balkanism,” the symbol and its negative
meaning have continuously resurfaced within everyday discourse in Bulgaria in order to refer to
traits, behaviors, individuals, and institutions perceived to be problematic. This discursive notion
has been adopted to the communal discourse of self- and other-identification. This article
explores the following questions: what are the local ways the “Bulgarian job” and
“Bulgarian-ness” is constructed and employed in daily interactions? What cultural norms are
explicitly constituted through talk about this symbol? What larger cultural values for being,
feeling, and dwelling are implicitly highlighted through the use of this symbol? What do these
meanings say explicitly and implicitly about the social world which they occupy? How is the use
of this symbol related to larger discursive constructions of the West-East divide? What are the
implications of such values and self- and other-identification?
“Bulgarian-ness” in the shifting geo-political contexts of communication
Previous research on a Bulgarian identity has predominantly been quantitative and focused on
specific diasporas (Tereshchenko & Archer, 2015; Genova, 2017), memory (Avdikos, 2013),
identity struggles within Roma populations (Nacu, 2011), identity and life satisfaction
(Dimitrova, Buzea, & Jordanov, 2013), and a Bulgarian identity in Macedonia (Nancheva &
Koneska, 2015). More recent research on identity has primarily focused on the effects and
implications of a European Union membership (Neofotistos, 2009), “European” identity
formation (Slavtcheva-Petkova & Mihelj, 2013), “Europeanness” as re-packaged identities

(Davidova, 2006), Bulgarian migrants abroad (Genova, 2017), and national identity (Rice, 2002;
Genov, 2006; Mitropolitski, 2014). There has also been a strong focus on transitology and the
country’s lack or need to “catch up” with its Western democratic counterparts (Szwat-Gyłybowa,
2014). Vassilev (2003) overviewed the problematic “transition” period in Bulgaria as a
combination of numerous factors, where “de-industrialization, unemployment, poverty, growing
income disparity, mass emigration, crime and corruption have reached alarming and destabilizing
proportions” (p.100) by citing a plethora of local and international research.
The focus on the “backward,” “primitive,” and “barbarian” when referring to the
geographical location of the Balkans, similar to Said’s (1995) notion of orientalism, has mostly
been discussed in detail by Todorova (2009, p.3): “What has been emphasized about the Balkans
is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by
and for the civilized world.” Todorova (2009) highlighted the ways such a notion was
institutionalized, starting with the Balkan wars (1912-13), in order to become one of the most
powerful derogatory designations across disciplines such as history, international relations, and
political science. Todorova (2009) also highlighted that this phenomenon began with innocent
inaccuracies due to incomplete knowledge of geography passed on through tradition; the
following infusion of political, socio-cultural, and ideological notes attached to the term
“Balkan” starting during World War I; and the following “dissociation” between the meaning and
the “object” coupled with later (post-1989) loaded ascription of said object with particular
political ideology.
Todorova (2009) emphasized that such balkanism was not a subspecies of orientalism as,
despite the numerous changes the geographical area had endured, historians often continued the
discourse and the use of the term as a powerful notion separate from historical time. She
(Todorova, 2009) argued that, unlike the often abstract aspects of “the Orient,” the Balkans’
geographical concreteness, their “Ottoman legacy,” and inability to fit in a neat East-West
dichotomy perpetuated their construction as not just an “incomplete other” but an “incomplete
self.” This notion crystallized over repeated use, and while scholars have questioned judging
Third world countries by colonial era views of civilization, this has not been the case for the
Balkans. The lack of colonial legacy and the discrepancy between Western European “classical”

notions of where the Balkans “should have arrived” and their actual socio-political trajectory
opened the door for “balkanism.” Additionally, Todorova argued (2009), Christianity (its
Orthodox nature) within the Balkans was both positioned as a subspecies of “oriental despotism
thus as inherently non-European or non-Western” (p.20) and a stronghold against said oriental
other-ness.
This study examines how this larger Western-centric discourse has been adopted and
internalized within the local community, where the participants themselves utilize these
West-East symbols and their one-sided meaning in order to rationalize the lack of significant
political change in Bulgaria as well as to self-identify politically. The East-West divide, as an
outcome of 18th-century and Enlightenment philosophies of evolution and progress towards
democracy, pitted countries against each other based on economic performance and clumped the
East as the epitome of all things industrially backward, lacking advanced social relations and
institutions, and possessing irrational and superstitious cultures—all “unmarked by Western
Enlightenment” (Todorova, 2009, p.11). Evolution meant the movement was not a simple one,
thus positioning the East (thus the Balkans) as both an elastic and ambiguous and a concrete
historical experience (Todorova, 2009): with both a “dark Ottoman legacy” in too many crucial
elements, constantly attempting to emulate a perceived European-ness, the “ultimate
Europeanization of the Balkans (p.13).” And while the Orient held a mystical, forbidden,
feminine, and sensual appeal, the Balkans embodied all the negatives, “uncivilized, primitive,
crude, cruel, and, without exception, disheveled,” a “reflected light of the Orient” (Todorova,
2009, p.14).
Szwat-Gyłybowa (2014) also criticized this notion of the need to “catch up,” as
prominent within a process view of a country’s development, which oversimplified and put a
variety of cultural, economic, social, philosophical, psychological, and geopolitical forces on a
continuum of development. And even though, Szwat-Gylybowa (2014) argued, such a
perspective had an optimistic potential of hope to invigorate countries on the developmental path
in the beginning, it still carried the stigma of immaturity linked to a biology focused paradigm of
development. Within Bulgaria, in particular, Szwat-Gylybowa (2014) argued that this notion of
“catching up” was part of the discussion even before the country became a political nation during

the initial modernization reforms during its time under the Ottoman Empire (19th century).
Todorova (1997) had previously argued similarly that such an inferiority was further developed
through a wave of students being educated abroad, only amplifying the subservient status
Christians had within the Ottoman Empire, where the millet was controlled by the Greeks. It was
social practices targeting cultural affinity and the tolerant living conditions in the Ottoman
Empire that allowed the community to survive as such, despite being far removed from positions
and structural instruments of status (Szwat-Gylybowa, 2014). Later, post-Ottoman Empire, the
“catching up” took the shape of cultural universalism and the notion of the “ancient soul” of the
people, only to be replaced by skepticism towards ongoing cultural change. Szwat-Gylybowa
(2014) highlighted that the phenomenon of “catching up” was further linked to frustration and
approached meta-critically in attempts to understand what that means for the country.
One argument against the notion of catching up used emic (to the local Orthodox
Christianity) terms to highlight the divergent notions of time—as spherical for the Orthodox East
as opposed to linear in the Latin West—a dichotomy that predates the Enlightenment and is
linked to a different reality and understanding of culture and history that emphasizes repetition
and not progress (Крумов, 2003). Thus, the earlier strive towards change, a Western-like
development, and the following frustration and dis-enchantment opened the way for questioning
and attempting to define what makes the country not follow such a path, concentrating on the
possible differences between Bulgaria and the West (Szwat-Gylybowa, 2014). Such difference
was then highlighted as “retardation,” “immaturity,” (stigmatized) or “religious domination”
(prized) despite the lack of everyday practices to support it. Kopecky and Mudde (2000) also
emphasized that despite the large number of empirical studies, which examine the wide disparity
between the democratization processes in East-Central Europe on one side and the Balkans and
post-Soviet republics on the other, there is not much agreement about what explains this disparity
and the research is predominantly linear and proscriptive—with Western democracies viewed as
the most advanced and the ones to be emulated. We would be wise to heed Kopecky and
Mudde’s (2000) call for a more nuanced and attuned approach to the diversity (conceptual,
political, and cultural) of state and nation building.

In response, the aim of this study is to examine the interactional construction of the
“Bulgarian mentality” (and any variations within this umbrella: “Bulgarian job/way,”
“Bulgarian-ness,” etc.) as the “others” (those who exhibit/possess it) and the deeper historically
bound cultural understandings, norms, and premises that guide such talk. When utilized in
interaction, such terms evoke and manage explicit and implicit statements about how people
understand themselves, as situated within their social worlds: who they are (personhood), what is
a proper way of feeling (emotion) within their social world, and the world they inhabit (dwelling)
(Carbaugh, 2007a). A variety of disciplines have recognized the role of language (Silverstein,
1979; Ochs, 1992; Irvine & Gal, 2000; Mendoza-Denton, 2002; etc.), discourse (Sherzer, 1987;
Fairclough, 1992; Urban, 2000; Carbaugh, 2007a; etc.) in the construction and maintenance of
social realities, where communication is constitutive of meanings and expressions of and about
reality (Carbaugh, 1995). Cultural discourse analysis is a way of analyzing communication as a
cultural resource and examining what practices locally “suggest generally” about human
communication (Carbaugh, 1995, p. 271).
The cultural meanings, which the participants employ during interaction (about
personhood, social relations, dwelling, emotion, and action) are understood as ‘‘hubs of cultural
meaning.’’ The role of the interpretative analysis, then, is to explain these hubs as the “ongoing
meta-cultural commentary” (Carbaugh, 2007, p. 174). Each hub implicates the others, even
though they may not be all active within an interaction, and include: meanings about being,
personhood and identity (who one is), meanings about relating and relationships (how we are
connected), meanings about acting, action and practice (what people consider themselves to be
doing), meanings about feeling and affect (what is appropriate, how, and where), and meanings
about dwelling and place (sense of place). As the analysis focuses on any one discursive hub as
focal (made explicit by the participants’ use of particular discursive devices, such as cultural
terms, phrases, gestures, etc.), related webs of “interrelated, taken-for-granted, cultural meanings,
concerning being, acting, relating, feeling, and dwelling” (Carbaugh, 2007, p. 174; Scollo &
Milburn, 2019, p. xxxiii), called semantic radiants of meaning, are also made implicit (Carbaugh
& Cerulli, 2012, 2017).

I re-examine the folk notion of “Balkan mentality,” or “dark Balkan character” as it has
entered everyday interactions and local conceptualizations of the self. This phenomenon is not
just confined to academic fields but is also a widely available local cultural notion, which gets
creatively used to discuss (excuse or blame) a variety of behaviors and socio-economic problems
and thus align politically (Author, under review). This study approaches understanding such
mystic generalizations by examining how the community itself utilizes and re-constitutes such
folk notions in order to both challenge and embrace their historical past: the creative ways such
“Bulgarian-ness” is actively constructed and constantly re-imagined in order to locate and
challenge problematic behaviors, self-identify, reinforce social relations, and align politically.
First, I discuss specific communication devices which make “Bulgarian-ness” explicit, and then
analyze the larger cultural values that are implicit in the discursive use of such resources.
Discourse Analysis of “Good job, but Bulgarian”
Data for this analysis was collected ethnographically (participant observations and interviews)
during the period of 2010-2016. I also have a native experience of the area as I grew up and lived
in Sofia, Bulgaria until 2003. During my fieldwork I recorded (per IRB standards) and took notes
of naturally occurring talk and interviews with 50 participants: over 94 hours of naturally
occurring talk at social events (households, public settings, travel, and miscellaneous service
encounters). Despite my insider position, I was often interactionally positioned as an outsider,
where people frequently mentioned that I have “forgotten how things in Bulgaria are.” The
participants perceiving me as a “non-Bulgarian” made for more frequent initiations of both
non-prompted and prompted talk about “Bulgarian-ness.” I recorded spontaneous discourse in
formal and informal settings, which was then examined for instances of identification and
mentions of Bulgarian-ness: “how we/Bulgarians are”, “Bulgarian job”, and/or a variation.
The instances of spontaneously occurring talk were then supplemented with more
structured interviews (40 hours), which include questions based on the data and my observations
as a native: what is considered to qualify as “Bulgarian-ness,” expressed attitudes towards the
phenomenon, and attitudes towards descriptions of behaviors that could be labeled as
“Bulgarian” or the “Bulgarian way.” Bulgarian was the tool for analysis, where the collection,
recording, and analysis was performed in the Bulgarian language, and then translated into

English for reporting purposes. Coded letters are given to the participants to protect their privacy.
Most of the utterances analyzed below come from the unprompted interactional part of the data:
as part of a spiral sequence of acts about the problematic socio-political situation in the country.
The participants often built upon each other’s statements without any prompting on my side.
Similarly, a large number comes from 2012 as I spent the longest period (6 months) of
continuous fieldwork there during that year.
All data was analyzed through cultural discourse analysis guidelines creating the
following steps: 1) An excerpt of the data (instances); 2) Highlighting local norms (propositions)
after each (locating two main discursive hubs) using the participants key communication
symbols and staying as close to the participants’ discursive choices in order to make the local
semantic logic in their discourse explicit (Carbaugh & Cerulli, 2017), and then; 3) Moving
laterally and formulating premises of belief and value.
Analysis
“Bulgarian-ness” instances
“Bulgarian-ness” and the “Bulgarian job” were frequently associated with something negative
and the participants provided specific instances as examples:
Bonus of 100,000 a person. The person on the street has no money for medication
while they get bonuses!
Here the people [as a whole] is messed up a lot… It is not normal!
He goes and kills a person, goes and runs him over and makes a deal with the
prosecutor buying them some brandy… and they take the money.
(March, 2012)
That guy, you know, created a business… and hires people, you see, hires people
and gives them some money, little, like a fifth of what it costs. Then tells them,
here, work. Then takes home the rest.
(April, 2012)
See how it is with medications… what madness it is here… there was a report and
the minister claims he just found out!
(July, 2012)

All state jobs are like that… so they first exaggerate their need: they need 5
people so they hire 15… And the 10 extra salaries they share amongst themselves.
Then give each other additional bonuses. And if they decide to lay you off the
state job, you get like 20 salaries!
(March, 2012)
The specific instances the participants brought up ranged from behaviors, individuals, to larger
structures and institutions: a person taking “bonuses,” a person not having enough money for
medication, the people as a whole being “messed up,” a person committing a driving violation
and then bribing prosecutors, a person cheating workers out of their pay, overpriced medication
and the minister knowing about it, as well as state jobs as a corrupt enterprise. On the surface,
there is no cohesion (grammatical or lexical) that ties across these instances. However, these
utterances highlight larger systems and cultural notions at play, which link and create cohesion
for the participants: When one uses the phrase “good job but Bulgarian,” it is to highlight all that
is deemed problematic as underlying tendencies that can be observed throughout and across
participants’ experiences.
“Bulgarian-ness” as behaviors
Often the participants offered further instances that can be grouped under the semantic categories
of behaviors, laws, and generic “other people.” When describing what actions would fall under
such “Bulgarian-ness,” the following phrases were offered, frequently building on each other
with more examples:
They haven’t learnt, young people, they come out like this, start buying their
driving licenses
They all think that absolutely anything is allowed
Everyone wants what others have
They steal subsidies
They don’t want to finish a job but only to take the money
They skin you alive, making a monkey out of you
Here they don’t care about credentials
(January, 2012)

Here, everyone wants to screw you over, to take your job… you complete the job
and they take the profit
(June, 2016)
It’s skinning you [taking everything] and no one cares at all
And after them a flood [do not care about consequences]
(March, 2012)
The utterances highlight an array of behaviors as falling under the notion of the “Bulgarian job”:
behaviors that disregard rules, purchase licenses (corruption in the education and driving
system); instead of focusing on one’s own job, it is common to focus on others’; engaging others
only for profit (swindling and cheating); not completing work but requiring payment, “skinning
you alive” as wanting more and more from individuals (whether in the form of work or
payments); doing things with no regard for the consequences (often used when discussing
environmental and construction issues); disregarding credentials and skills in favor of nepotism
and connections; and blatant corruption (stealing agricultural subsidies).
“Bulgarian-ness” as law(lessness)
In addition to behaviors, “Bulgarian-ness” was also discursively assigned to local laws (or lack
thereof) by the participants:
Hitting someone on a pedestrian crossing, and 20 leva [$10] is the fine
Some hilarious mockery of laws
Look at what laws we have
Ridiculous laws
These laws, all this, is made so the prosecutors, prosecutors and judges, so they
can suck money from the rest
(April, 2012)
It’s all about skinning others
There are no laws really, there’s absolutely nothing
They say “it was legal”! How is it legal, when they create these laws!
What law! When they made it up!

(March, 2012)
Underlying questionable laws that do not punish infractions (pedestrian crossing violations),
laws created to impose extra fines and allow for corruption, lack of laws directed at prosecuting
said corruption, and laws created to protect and serve a select group of people were discursively
positioned as the “Bulgarian way,” as a meaning-laden base where problematic behaviors
resulted in problematic laws.
“Bulgarian-ness” as “others”
The participants verbal depictions of what is deemed problematic, the “Bulgarian job,” included
not only behaviors and laws, but the people as a whole:
The people became very bad
The people became animalistic [oskotj]
(January 2011, March 2012)
The people became crazy
It is scary, and this is everyone
(June 2013, July 2014)
This is a mafia for me
That’s the same mafia
What people, what madness
(March 2012, August 2015)
How do these people put up with this, with this misery!
It’s sheep stuff, never protesting
All they care for is getting elected. Once they are that’s it.
We are sheep
That’s why they say ‘lowered head’ [gets no sword], right. Cause that’s what we
are used to… always “ be quiet, calm down”
(January 2014, March 2012)
Scoundrels
Everyone wants money

Scary scoundrels
[It’s all structures] which vegetate and suck from the people… And steal money!
So all these structures don’t work. If [they] worked well, we wouldn’t be in this
situation!
The money all goes in one small circle [of people], all the state money is there
(April, June 2012)
This array of utterances depicts distinct and multilayered local notions of the Bulgarian people as
a whole. The use of the term naroda (the people) refers to all the inhabitants as a unit, a cohesive
whole that has become “very bad,” “animalistic,” and “crazy.” The literal meaning of the term
oskotj is “to become like cattle,” to become animal-like, and is used to allude to herd behaviors:
easily led, easily swayed, without one’s own reason. Frequently, the participants used utterances
highlighting the people of Bulgaria as a whole “becoming herd-like,” with references to “sheep”
and “sheep mentality.” The people were also described as becoming crazy, “bad,” and like
scoundrels.
Despite numerous references to “people” as a whole “becoming” problematic, the talk
about “Bulgarian-ness” as itself problematic often veered back to specific behaviors, which were
labeled as scoundrel-like: stealing and appropriating money, wanting to be elected in
government/state position so that one could appropriate more money, and being part of the mafia.
Again and again, a particular cultural logic clumped together behaviors related to both engaging
in (taking state and government positions, appropriating money) and allowing for corruption (not
protesting, being like sheep and voting for particular corrupt individuals, denying reports of said
crimes). Utterances that may seem contradictory linguistically (grammatically and logically)
become cohesive within a larger cultural logic where “they” (as the problem) are both
“scoundrels” and “sheep.” The participants frequently did not elaborate or use specific names to
identify the “mobster,” “the corrupt government official,” but used a generic “they,” which their
conversants used as an object in order to provide further examples of corruption and amounts of
money that have been appropriated, and thus align away or distance themselves from.
The participants used segments from a local proverb—Slonena glavica, sabj ne j seche
(A bent head, no sword can cut), which alluded to a shared belief that it was better not to stand

out, not to disagree even if you were in the right as there might be consequences such as losing
your head. This notion was frequently highlighted by participants when discussing the lack of
political action, and particularly the lack of protesting against problems in the country. The
proverb was also used to highlight the lack of opposition to corruption and the continuous
political support (or at least the lack of opposition to) for particular parties and governments that
had continuously failed to “fix things” in the country. It is the larger cultural system of these
symbols (behaviors, laws, individuals and/or structures) and their meanings (as within a
particular “way of being, feeling, and dwelling”) that shapes the communicative structuring and
grouping of these items together that is particularly interesting. Corruption in government jobs,
the judicial system, employment, subsidies, receiving of licenses, high prices of medication, the
abuse of road laws, problematic government jobs, wanting money without completing jobs,
problematic laws, and lack of an active protest culture are not uncommon and they are not
confined to a national border. But here, discursively, they are constructed as the “Bulgarian way.”
As communication offers an entry into the meaningful social life of people, paying
attention to what is communicated highlights a particular cultural structuring of the world. The
above utterances highlight a world in which specific problematic instances are linked to larger
problematic issues as an outcome of being “Bulgarian”: Many people in the country profit by
taking large bonuses (Bonus of 100 000 a person) while others are suffering from poverty (The
person on the street has no money for medication); many people are committing crimes but can
get away with them as they can just pay their way through the legal system (and makes a deal
with the prosecutor buying them some brandy; there was a report and the minister claims he just
found out); problematic business practices are abundant (That guy, you know, created a
business… Then tells them, here, work. Then pockets the rest; they first exaggerate their need:
they need 5 people so they hire 15… And the 10 worth of salaries they share amongst
themselves; they don’t care about credentials); and laws are created to serve and benefit some
and not others (Hitting someone on a pedestrian crossing, and 20 leva [$10] is the fine; mockery
of laws; ridiculous laws; laws… made so the prosecutors, prosecutors and judges, so they can
suck money from the rest; there are no laws really, there’s absolutely nothing; how is it legal,
when they set those laws; made up [laws]). The utterances further link such behaviors and

practices to the people as a whole: the whole nation’s people have become “bad,” “messed up a
lot,” and “not normal”: where everyone is the problem (everyone wants to screw you over, to take
your job… you complete the job and they take the profit; they skin you alive, making a monkey
out of you; It’s skinning you (taking everything) and don’t care at all; and after them a flood),
people have become like animals (oskotj; became crazy), and no one is doing anything about it
(How do these people put up with this, with this misery; It’s sheep stuff, never protesting; We are
sheep; That’s why they say ‘lowered head’ [gets no sword] right. Cause that’s what we are used
to… always ‘quiet, calm down’). Such behaviors and practices are both the national “cognition”
and learnt (They haven’t learnt, young people, they come out like this, started buying their
driving licenses; They all think that absolutely everything is allowed; Everyone wants what
others have).
The participants’ utterances vacillate between constructing the problem as “them,” a
select circle (They don’t want to finish a job but only to take the money; This is a mafia for me;
That’s the same mafia; All they care for is getting elected. Once they are that’s it; Scoundrels;
Scary scoundrels; The money all goes in one small circle [of people], all the state money are
there) and “everyone” (The people became crazy; It is scary, and this is everyone; Everyone
wants money; What people, what craziness) and the structures they have engendered ([It’s all
structures] which vegetate and suck from the people… And steal money! So all these structures
don’t work. If [they] worked well, we wouldn’t be in this situation!). I argue that this discursive
movement back and forth is not just an array of semantic dimensions, along which participants
identify themselves through communication, but a result of a particular cultural logic. This logic
is rooted within the larger local narrative of the “Bulgarian mentality,” or a cultural
understanding of national identity as biological, learnt, and deeply embedded within a
socio-historic context. According to the myth of the “Bulgarian situation” (Author, 2018), the
500 years of Ottoman “slavery” and the following years of communism shaped and reinforced a
“mentality” (way of understanding and behaving within the world) that are deeply problematic.
According to the myth (Author, 2018), the “mentality” is biological (cognitive and
psychological) and learnt (national)—difficult to change, yet confined within national borders.
This can be seen within the utterances as the following premises: “Bulgarian-ness” as a “national

mentality” (being), the “Bulgarian situation” (dwelling), frustration and futility (emotion), and
sheepish following (action). Below, I formulate cultural premises of being and emotion as central
in addition to dwelling.
Interpretation
Statements of and about “Bulgarian-ness” made by the participants highlight a wide and dense
semantic radiation, where often the analysis has to constantly shift between the hub and its
radiants. I focus on two central hubs with interconnected radiants, identity (being) and emotion
(feeling), as highly interlocked.
“Bulgarian-ness” as a “national mentality” (being)
Within the participants’ utterances, an underlying cultural notion of a problematic “other”
becomes visible—an amalgam of what they considered problematic. By discursively crafting an
“other” as a unit, the participants can then utilize this notion in order to create a diametrically
opposed footing for themselves. “Bulgarian-ness,” as interactionally constructed, involves such
problematic behaviors, which are both to blame and to embrace as formative. There is no
“Bulgarian-ness” without the problematic behaviors. But also, there is no “us” without suffering
from these problematic behaviors. This notion of “Bulgarian-ness” emerges in the interaction (by
sharing instances of how one has been affected by it), fragmented and partial. “Us, without the
mentality” is only visible as an opposition to “them, with the mentality.” The interactional
symbolic play between these levels of identification is observed in numerous interactions, where
the participants highlight social positions that are either “us” (“normal” people, not linked to
corruption) and “them” (the “others,” who are corrupt). Within such an interactional process, the
participants move in a spiraling sequence, passing and implicating between the identities of “us”
and the “others,” with each identity needing and motivating the talk about the other.
Verdery (1996) discussed the roots of such duality within socialist countries, where a
moral opposition within the community was common: a division between “good” and “bad,”
which translated into “against” and “for” the Party. The political opposition understood itself as
representing the collective objective of the whole society, which was betrayed by its Party. Such
a “social schizophrenia,” or split of persona into a “public” and “private” one, was common for
many Eastern European countries, where people would perform the mandatory Party-related

activities at work but would “switch off” and reveal their “true” self (a self—critical of the Party
and its representatives) in private (Verdery, 1996). This “true” self could only be understood and
realized in relation, as “parasitic” to the public/official one, where people’s sense of personhood
was not only dependent on but required an “enemy.” As a result, once the party rule was over,
this notion and understanding of the self produced a crisis of personhood as the “them” was
gone. A new “enemy” was needed. In the discursive instances here, this identification translated
into the need to construct an “other” as a compilation of
behaviors/individuals/structures/institutions associated with the country’s communist past.
Within the utterances, larger categories and symbols associated with corruption, a
specific identity of the “others”, as historically grounded is evoked and reinforced. As seen in
this data, the “others” are those who possess the “Bulgarian mentality,” a specific cultural notion
of “national psychology” described by Author (2018): behaviors and ways of thinking, that have
historical roots but have come to be associated with a biological/cognitive state. Those with the
“mentality” take bonuses and steal from the rest, create laws to benefit themselves, are part of
state systems which do not work well, have connections to power, are lazy, and do not serve the
people. The participants offered numerous problematic instances, where the “other” is unclear
and vague. This generalized “other” is not confined to ethnic, generational, gender, or class
categories but functions to replace the outside “enemy,” and serve as a target, which one could
blame for the economic problems in the country. While there is a large corruption problem in
Bulgaria, this article only focuses on the interactional discursive attempts participants engage in
in order to define and allocate the root of such everyday problems. According to the participants,
the “others” were: clients who came with the sole purpose of starting a quarrel, local government
officials who took bribes and did not perform their job, officials who manipulated elections,
individuals who took advantage of the system and stole anything that was not nailed to the
ground, bankers who were scamming innocent people, and mobsters and oligarchs who had
overrun the country. But mostly, it included those who were somehow connected and benefited
from such connections.
This fluid and vague compilation of behaviors, individuals, institutions, and structures,
which has the “mentality” as underlying “cause,” I argue, is the discursive result of the divide

between legality and legitimacy, common for post-socialist countries. Giordano and Kostova
(2002) highlighted the Bulgarian land reform as part of the source of such divide, where any new
legal framework was immediately and consistently circumvented via social practices (which
people deemed more appropriate to their circumstances). In this way, legal norms and institutions
started coexisting with other common social norms for conduct that were not very “legal” (or
even “extra-legal”), but were locally considered legitimate. Giordano and Kostova (2002)
emphasized that the interplay and frequent competition between the “extra-legal” and the “legal”
in people’s everyday lives led to misinterpretations and tensions between the state and the
people—something visible in the data. The authors further argued that the particular case in
Bulgaria was made worse due to the additional accumulation of distrust between people and the
state over the centuries of Ottoman domination (the chiflik system). Additionally, with elites
ruling during the years following the liberation and the later years of socialism, where an
informal economy, black market, and emphasis on networking were the main resources, this
divide between legality and legitimacy was further widened.
Frustration and futility (feeling)
Examining the problematics of “Bulgarian-ness” as an implicit cultural hub could not be fully
understood without also highlighting its interconnectedness with emotion as another central hub
of cultural meaning: frustration, outrage, anger, and disapproval are visible in the participants’
utterances as direct exclamations (repetitions, generic phrases, instances), directed talk
(constructed speech addressing those perceived to be problematic), cursing, or non-verbals (sighs
and raised intonation). The following excerpt (March 2012) illustrates the act of offering
instances of problematic behaviors—in this case the purchasing of driving licenses without
passing the road or paper test. As one participant mentioned how many people purchased their
licenses and drove after a few days without knowing the rules, his interlocutor quickly aligned in
agreement to the mentioning of corrupt policemen, thus clumping them together with the
“illegal” drivers. Here, the emotion can be observed in G’s exclamation of “to die, their mother”
(the Bulgarian equivalent of “damn them”) in the last line:
G: I have been five months in driving school, [while] he became a driver in five
days and he bought the license, without knowing the rules, or anything else

N: he bought it!
G: and tomorrow the cops, the corrupted cops will come
N: yes!
G: and they’ll defend him... to die, their mother!
The participants provided numerous similar “illustrations” to highlight the omnipresence of
anger, defeat, and resentment, which find an outlet in yelling and cursing at others on the streets.
Anger as present throughout the “Bulgarian society” is repeated and framed as both a cause and a
response to the many cases of police and legal injustice, where criminals and perpetrators are
never punished. Cases of such “lawlessness” are reiterated to legitimize and confirm the anger
and frustration. Physical violence seems to be the only way to get justice, even to a “normal”
(term used frequently by the participants) person, where it is the only means to punish the guilty.
Despite their different backgrounds and occupations, lifestyles and history, many participants
highlighted “becoming bad” as part of the shared “Bulgarian” experience.
These utterances highlight a cultural notion of anger as the proper feeling in response to
such problematic behaviors—proper—as it is engendered by the unfairness, corruption, and
general aggression and apathy. This anger is not only expressed in the data explicitly but can also
be heard in the voices of the participants: their pitch rises and their utterances are interspersed
with exclamations, curse words, and commonly used phrases filled with pathos and accompanied
by a sigh such as “what do you expect—who would educate them” (kakvo ochakvash—koi da gi
vazpita), “I’m getting desperate, you think it can’t be worse, but it is” (otchaivam se, mislish che
poveche ot tova ne moge, no ima go), and “the people has gone totally mad” (naroda e totalno
izterjsal). Participants also highlighted the ways this constant anger and frustration from dealing
with the “others” resulted in physical ailments, once more emphasizing the link between
environment and biology (the “mentality” as national and cognitive). They often stressed how
the body could not handle the daily stress and irritation by mentioning relatives or friends who
“ended up in a hospital because of all the stress. (February 2012).” Thus, implicitly, a larger
cultural premise of negative emotions (anger, frustration, and misery) as deeply linked within the
national border becomes visible within the data: a cultural notion of understanding
Bulgarian-ness as inseparable and intricately linked to anger and frustration. As the “mentality”

is the “national cognition,” one is either espousing it (thus causing anger and frustration to others
by being a corrupt/lying/cheating/skinning individual, who perpetuates problematic ways of
doing things) or suffering from those who have it and responding with indignation, anger, and
frustration.
As such, when the participants offer problematic instances they have experienced they do
not just tap into shared local knowledge in order to create solidarity and air grievances. They use
generic phrases (“it is scary stuff:” strashna rabota), numbers (referring to reported amounts of
bribes, “bonuses,” and other money “disappearing”), and individual instances (stories), as
shorthand to evoke and link their experiences within a shared cultural environment. Such
common experience binds them together and against those perceived to be the problem. This
shared problematic experience is evoked through a recognizable array of generic phrases such as:
“horrible/heavy stuff” tegava rabota
“No getting better” nema opravia
“Scary situation here, scary” strashno pologenieto tuka , strashno
“It’s impossible to live here” t’va e nevazmogno da se givee
“It’s cruel stuff” gestoka rabota e
“It’s nightmare stuff” koshmarna rabota
And by the use of such shorthand they also position themselves as “not the problematic” ones,
the ones that do not have the “mentality,” and “not the others,” thus further distancing
themselves away from the East and the Balkans. When using these phrases, the participants
employ explicit cultural symbols in order to make implicit statements about “Bulgarian-ness” as
tied to the “mentality” and make sense of their present day socio-economic problems, where a
particular sense of being is understood as both situated within a national border and as a
biological trait that is difficult to change (which then assumes a particular cultural understanding
of social relations, proper emotions, and larger dwelling).
The “Bulgarian situation” and mistrust (dwelling)
The participants’ speech acts are shaped by their shared cultural knowledge which allows for
collaboration in creating the notion of the “others” and in doing so, they also evoke the larger

notion of what social world they inhabit. When offering utterances that comment on the
individuals, behaviors, structures, and institutions they find problematic, the participants also
highlight a view of the world: where people have gone “bad” and “crazy,” where everyone is
“out to get you” and “skin you,” where everyone “thinks they are above the rules,” where things
have become “a complete anarchy,” a world where corruption on all levels is abundant, laws are
made to serve a select group, and problematic work practices are the norm.
The myth of the “Bulgarian situation” (Author, 2018) highlights the enduring cultural
premise of social mistrust, where Bulgarians view themselves to be bound within a problematic
common fate, which was replayed and re-learnt to a point of becoming a national cognitive
feature. This notion of social mistrust (and particularly its production) has been examined within
post-socialism studies such as Giordano and Kostova (2002), where they noted that many
post-socialist countries have encountered problems in establishing confidence in the state and
trust in the institutions, and the legitimacy of legal power. They argued that such a phenomenon
is not surprising considering that over a long period of time the state had repeatedly failed to
perform its fundamental duties (creating the conditions to guarantee a space in which people can
trust each other). Giordano and Kostova (2002) highlighted that such mistrust is based on
specific practices stemming from past negative experiences, but is also reactivated discursively
in the present (collective memory).
Conclusion
I suggest that examining this Bulgarian case of culturally laden communication offers several
insights: the way larger notions of the West-East divide, part of the larger “transitology”
discourse, no matter how crude and skewed, have been incorporated and internalized into
everyday negotiations of identity and self within the Bulgarian public. Thus, we see the
“Bulgarian” (ethnic and national) identity as ongoing interactional work despite its long roots
and history, and furthermore, such self-identification can occur as strategic political work
through exactly this ideological alignment to the West or the East. As such, this case extends
prior scholarly critiques of “transitology” by offering further evidence that the West-East
dichotomy is an inadequate geo-political framework for understanding everyday interactions in
post-socialist societies like Bulgaria. The case adds to Todorova’s (2009) work examining

balkanism as different from Orientalism by illustrating how the “Balkan” self is not just
constructed as “incomplete” but is fragmented and built from such West-East pieces, regardless
of whether it is perceived with pride (Author, 2018) or used as a political maneuver (Author,
under review).
Utilizing Carbaugh’s (2007; Carbaugh & Cerulli, 2017) cultural discourse analysis allows
for further examination of the interconnectedness of the hubs of identity and emotion: in the
Bulgarian case we see them as inseparable (political and socio-economic frustration as part of
identity work). I highlight the incorporation (constitution and reinforcement) of larger discourses
(Balkanism and national identity as deeply problematic, stuck forever in between the West and
the East) within everyday interactions in addition to the local cultural organization of
communication: the Bulgarian case illustrates the world’s larger political and discursive forces in
new modes of alignment. International and intercultural communication scholars would benefit
from this case as it illustrates the ongoing interactional identity work as a response to a
long-lasting change in the larger socio-economic context (in this case, the lack of significant
political change within Bulgaria and emigration), where identity work is not only responding to
outside and inside cultural and communication shifts but is also strategically used to navigate a
status quo one does not perceive to have much control over.
This article tackles the notion of “good job but Bulgarian” (Hubava rabota, ama
Bulgarska) as a local cultural symbol, that highlights both deep cultural meanings for a way of
being (“Bulgarian-ness” as something problematic and related to a “national mentality”), feeling
(anger, frustration, hopelessness, and general mistrust), a social world (the “Bulgarian situation”
as a “miserable,” “no-state,” and “mafia country”), and also an attempt to embrace or at least
explain why significant change is yet to occur. This “dark legacy” and dichotomization of the
West-East was further transplanted onto attempts to make sense of the Bulgarian “transition”
from communism to “democracy” following 1989, as the population’s frustration with the lack of
substantial “democratization” grew. Vassilev (2003) highlighted the difficult move to a capitalist
economy (from a deeply centralized one), the short-term effects of market-oriented reforms and
the following setbacks, which resulted in economic “stagnation, unemployment, inflation,
increasing inequality of incomes, widespread impoverishment,” (p.100) and widespread and

deeply rooted organized crime and corruption. This was further affected by party struggles and
continuous pursuit of corrupt, self-serving, and incompetent policies, where new policies were
often completely divorced from previous (even functioning ones) on a purely ideological basis,
without establishing new economic institutions and relationships. It is also the persevering
omnipresent habits of malfeasance and crime (theft on the job and institutionalized corruption),
which resulted in systemic “criminalized” state (Vassilev, 2003), which get addressed and evoked
within interaction. Sygkelos (2010) similarly highlighted the problematic effects from
ill-conceived institutional reforms, omnipresent corruption, organized crime, poverty, increasing
economic inequality, and a failure to develop a well-functioning welfare state as the core reasons
for continuous mistrust in the government as well as the rise of populist nationalism.
Whether labeling behaviors (being lazy in the office, corruption in the Bulgarian soccer
league, appropriation of EU funds for a highway), individuals (emphasizing that the Brazilian
president has Bulgarian roots), or institutions/infrastructure (streets with potholes and faulty
asphalt, a major road along the coastline of Bulgaria, electric pole) under the umbrella of “the
Bulgarian job” online or in interactions, the main undercurrent seems to be that if it is
“Bulgarian,” it cannot be “good.” In numerous cases, “Bulgarian-ness,” as inseparable from the
“Bulgarian mentality,” is actively constructed under the generic umbrella of the “others” (those
who have the “mentality”) through the use of specific generic phrases, and instances of
problematic behaviors, individuals, and institutions/structures. Highlighting instances of who the
“others” are, thus serves to both self-identify and reinforce local cultural notions of being,
feeling, and dwelling (by evoking and managing their common knowledge of a shared cultural
notion of the “Bulgarian mentality”), and allows the interlocutors to locate and challenge
problematic behaviors, structures, and institutions.
Examining the discursive ways through which a particular social identity of
“Bulgarian-ness” is constructed as an “us” vs. “others” alignment is particularly fruitful in order
to understand the continuous ways a post-socialist background is evoked and managed within
social interactions in Bulgarian discourse. Scholars from within anthropology, sociology,
economics, political science, history, and postsocialism (Hann, Humphrey, and Verdery, 2003)
have highlighted the need for ethnographic approach to studying postsocialist countries, and,

particularly, the need to examine the everyday implications of the transition from socialism to a
market economy. A more nuanced, interpretive analysis of such discourses offers a deeper
understanding of the transitory status of countries in the Balkans—one going beyond an image of
a “bridge” or “crossroads” (Todorova, 2009).
As people grew up and spent most of their lives within one system, their sense of being,
of proper behavior, and sensemaking was inextricably connected to the larger ideology behind
that system. And as part and parcel of that larger culture, one cannot fully make sense of the
“Bulgarian job” and “Bulgarian-ness” without paying close attention to the ideological and
discursive socialist past of the country. Yurchak (2013) similarly discussed the transitional period
in other socialist countries, highlighting that even though the popular view of
socialist/communist ideology has been one of “truth” and “falsity”, or “official public” and
“hidden intimate” insider views of ideology, the reality of the process was much more different:
people did not just pretend to subscribe to the party ideology; they did not “hide” their different
understanding of the status quo.
Burawoy and Verdery (1999) discussed the common for post-socialist countries
phenomenon of utilizing familiar (from socialism) symbols and meanings in order to navigate
and explain new experiences and patterns (whether that be new market initiatives, new social
relations, privatization, etc.), highlighting that such a phenomenon is not necessarily indicative of
a leftover “mentality”. Such a view would render their way of being “corrupted” and unable to
change and adapt to new political forms. On the contrary, Burawoy and Verdery (1999) argued,
interaction employs numerous symbols and meanings that are not created from scratch but utilize
already familiar forms in new ways and with new sensibilities, which means that what is
frequently seen as “restoration,” is more often a creative use of already existing elements. An
ethnographic approach is very suited to exploring such new, yet old, innovation and revision of
forms, which are responses to particularly unstable conditions such as a socio-political and
economic transition. It is such novel adaptations of existing forms (and particularly participant
notions of self and others) that this study explores.
“Bulgarian-ness” as emerging in everyday interactions within a spiraling act sequence
seems to be here to stay: discussing “how bad things in Bulgaria are,” “how other countries do

it/anything better,” and “the Bulgarian job” are still very prevalent in online and in-person
interactions: blog and article posts, discussions of emigration (Locmele & Sotirova, 2018),
everyday exclamations, and even small talk. Even though it may not be immediately evident to a
non-native, it soon gets noticed that “Bulgarians seem to be very negative” and “Bulgarians
complain a lot about their country.” This warrants a whole different study, but here I offer a small
piece of the puzzle to this “negativity”—interactional constructions of “Bulgarian-ness” as
something problematic and long-lived, something not-yet-European and “backward.” Such an
examination of a national identity highlights the significance of everyday interaction in the
negotiation of larger ideological constructs of the West-East divide that have permeated the
national consciousness. This both builds on the literature criticizing the larger academic
“transitology” discourse but also illustrates how such problematic notions have been adopted
locally. As such, despite the long and varied history of the “Bulgarian” identity (both ethnic and
national), we should see this case as an example of identity as ongoing interactional work, where
a common “other” is creatively constructed in order for one to align to or distance from—a move
with very particular political implications (whether one stands with the West or the East).
Despite the wide criticism of employing such an oversimplified and crude dichotomy, the
West-East divide is still used frequently to measure Balkan, Post-Soviet, and Baltic countries that
do not fit the expected trajectory towards democracy, and as such, this case lends empirical
evidence to critiques of “transitology.” Furthermore, this case adds to Todorova’s (2009) work
examining Balkanism as different from Orientalism by illustrating how the “Balkan” self is not
just constructed as “incomplete” but is actively constructed as fragmented and borrowing from
either the West or the East. By using Carbaugh’s (2007; Carbaugh & Cerulli, 2017) cultural
discourse analysis perspective the interconnectedness of the hubs of identity and emotion is
explored: they could not be easily separated within the notion of “Bulgarian-ness” where
frustration and anger (or satisfaction) with the political and socio-economic situation in the
country is then coupled with Western or Eastern ideology. The Bulgarian case offers an example
as to the significance of how and why the study of communication in transitional societies is
important overall, as it crystalizes the ways in which no discourse and no identity is truly

local—something truly helpful to keep in mind in the ongoing study of international and
intercultural communication.
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